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Abstract. This paper explains and tests empirically why people employed in product
promotion are less willing to trust others. Product promotion is a prototypical setting in
which employees are mandated to express attitudes that are often not fully sincere. On the
basis of social projection theory, we predicted that organizational agents mandated to
express insincere attitudes project their self-perceived dishonesty onto others and thus
become more distrustful. An initial large-scale, multi-country field study found that indi-
viduals employed in jobs requiring product promotion were less trusting than individuals
employed in other jobs—particularly jobs in which honesty is highly expected. We then
conducted two experiments in which people were tasked with promoting low-quality
products and either were allowed to be honest or were asked to be positive (as would
be expected of most salespeople). We found that mandated attitude expression reduced
willingness to trust, and this effect was mediated by a decrease in the perceived honesty
of the self, which, in turn, reduced the perceived honesty of other people. Our research
suggests that the widely used practice of mandating attitude expression has the effect of
undermining an essential ingredient of economic functioning—trust.
Keywords: trust • mandated attitude expression • product promotion • social projection
Introduction
When interacting with customers, suppliers, or part-
ners, organizational agents are often mandated, for-
mally or informally, to express specific attitudes irre-
spective of whether such attitudes are truthful. We
refer to this behavior as mandated attitude expres-
sion. For example, negotiators are often advised to
imply that they have alternatives even when they do
not (Cohen 1980), and managers are told to give some
positive feedback to employees even when their per-
formance is not positive (Bohlander and Snell 2006).
Mandated attitude expression is particularly common
in the context of product promotion (Williams et al.
2009), as there is a clear directive to present products as
desirable to consumers (Kotler and Armstrong 2014).
Shop assistants are expected to suggest that the cloth-
ing offered in the store looks good on the customer
(even when it does not), marketers are told to omit
negative product properties (e.g., the sugar content in
sodas), and car salespeople are instructed to inform the
customer that the deal they are making is the best one
they can make (while being encouraged by the man-
agement to extract as much profit as possible).
These mandates of dishonesty may be useful to
achieve some organizational objectives (e.g., sales tar-
gets). However, we argue here that they come with
unintended psychological and social costs. Specifically,
we build on social projection theory to propose that
organizational agents mandated to express attitudes
that do not represent the facts come to view themselves
as less honest, project this view onto general and spe-
cific others, and becomemore distrustful as a result (see
Figure 1). Trust refers to “the willingness of a party to
be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on
the expectation that the other will perform a particu-
lar action important to the trustor” (Mayer et al. 1995,
p. 712). Trust facilitates social coordination at all levels
of human interaction: it is essential for the functioning
of teams (Dirks 1999), organizations (Zaheer et al. 1998),
and entire economies (Zak and Knack 2001). If our
theory is correct, then mandates of dishonesty hinder
social coordination, which is economically beneficial
to both corporations and societies. Moreover, tasking
employees with activities that make them view them-
selves and others as more dishonest thwarts the funda-
mental psychological need to find theworld a trustwor-
thy and benevolent place (Stevens and Fiske 1995).
We tested our theory in three studies. In Study 1, we
report an initial, large-sample, multicountry, correla-
tional field study examining the relationship between
being employed in sales (Williams et al. 2009) and the
willingness to trust others, or trust propensity. The
advantage of this study is that it used random sam-
pling in 20 different countries, making it an exter-
nally valid test of the basic relationship implied by
418
Published in Organization Science, Volume 29, Issue 3, 1 May 2018, Pages 418-431.
ht ps: /doi. rg/10.1287/ sc.2017.1190
Pitesa, Goh, and Thau: Mandated Attitudes and Trust
Organization Science, 2018, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 418–431, ©2018 INFORMS 419
Figure 1. Theoretical Model Tested in Studies 2 and 3
Mandated attitude
expression
Study 2: b = –2.21, p < 0.001
Study 3: b = –1.31, p < 0.001
Study 2: b = 0.23, p < 0.001
Study 3: b = 0.31, p < 0.001
Study 2: b = 0.32, p < 0.001
Study 3: b = 0.14, p < 0.001
Perceived honesty
of the self
Perceived honesty
of others
Willingness to
trust (in general and
specific others)
Notes. Coefficients from structural equation modeling are displayed below relevant paths. The overall indirect effect is significant in both
studies (Study 2 confidence interval: −0.26, −0.09, Study 3 confidence interval: −0.11,−0.03); see the Results sections for details.
our theory. We followed up the correlational study
with two experiments (Studies 2 and 3) that sought to
replicate the effect and test the psychological mecha-
nism implied by social projection theory. Specifically,
we asked participants to promote an obviously low-
quality product, and we either mandated the expres-
sion of favorable (dishonest) attitudes or allowed for
the expression of honest attitudes, after which we
observed consequences for participants’ self-perceived
honesty, perceived honesty of others, and their general
(Study 2) and specific (Study 3) willingness to trust
others.
Our research makes several theoretical, empirical,
and practical contributions. First, the findings we re-
port are practically relevant because the organizational
practice of mandating the expression of at least some-
what insincere attitudes is widespread. Take the exam-
ple of the product promotion context that our stud-
ies focus on. Promoting company products or services
is the core requirement of jobs in advertising, public
relations, personal selling, sales promotion, and direct
marketing (Kotler and Armstrong 2014). The U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau (2013) lists over 23million people employed
in “sales occupations,” such as employees in retail,
wholesale, services, real estate, and insurance. This
number excludes managerial and professional posi-
tions in sales and marketing, which constitute another
1.2 million executives. The sheer number of people
engaged in promotion activities (the figures above add
up to nearly a quarter of all full-time, year-round work-
ers in the United States) suggest that the effect we doc-
ument could have systemic consequences for organiza-
tions and economies.
We also make a theoretical contribution to research
on trust in organizations. Past research that examined
antecedents of trust focused almost exclusively on how
characteristics of interaction partners influence trust,
such as another person’s benevolence and competence
(Colquitt et al. 2007, Mayer et al. 1995). Yet there is evi-
dence that employees vary greatly in how willing to
trust they are across situations (see, e.g., Colquitt et al.
2007 for a meta-analysis). Differences in the propen-
sity to trust, however, have gone largely unexplained
in the organizational sciences. Individual differences
of employees are predominantly seen as fixed and
serve as explanations of behavior rather than as a
phenomenon deserving explanation. This is surpris-
ing considering that disciplinary personality research
highlights that personality traits are susceptible to con-
textual influences and are likely to be shaped by work
roles, life events, and social environments (Brousseau
and Prince 1981, Roberts et al. 2006, Rushton et al. 2008,
Srivastava et al. 2003). This past research on the flexi-
bility of personality traits provides some indirect sup-
port for our theory that individual differences in trust
propensity are subject to external influence. A meta-
analysis examining changes in personality traits over
the life span found considerable heterogeneity in indi-
vidual changes in agreeableness (Roberts et al. 2006), a
higher-order personality trait of which trust propensity
is a subtrait (Costa et al. 1991). If individuals’ agree-
ableness (and by extension, their willingness to trust)
changes over time, then it is possible that some of
this change is explained by people taking on specific
work roles. The theoretical model we develop below
suggests that organizational mandates of dishonesty
influence employee self-perceptions of how trustwor-
thy they are, a self-view they then project onto others.
This process, we argue, can explain why employees
in such work roles become less trusting as a result.
In this way, our research draws attention not only to
the utility of understanding how work roles impact
employee traits but also to the fact that different orga-
nizational practices and policies commonly utilized in
modern organizations might inadvertently undermine
trust through this overlooked channel influencing trust
propensity.
Our studies also make a contribution to the large
body of research examining employees working in jobs
that entail a potential discrepancy between their actual
dispositions and the message they are supposed to
convey to customers, including research on employee
acting (Grandey 2003). This literature focused almost
exclusively on the effectiveness and consequences of
having to display emotions—for example, smiling
when one does not feel like smiling. Our research
highlights a more fundamental yet overlooked fact
about such work: employees often need to be less
than entirely honest to be effective at their work. In
so doing, we uncover interpersonal, rather than just
Pitesa, Goh, and Thau: Mandated Attitudes and Trust
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intrapersonal, consequences caused by organizational
policies mandating attitude expression. We also con-
tribute to past research on employee acting by using
an experimental methodology. Research on employee
acting almost exclusively used passive observational
studies, which are limited in their ability to disentangle
the causal impact of the work itself from self-selection
effects.
Finally, our work contributes to the general man-
agement literature in which promotion (defined by
an expression of organizationally mandated attitudes;
Kotler and Armstrong 2014, p. 428) is advocated as
the first and most important component of the “mar-
keting mix” (along with product, price, and place)
through which companies increase their chances of
economic success. The positive sides of effective pro-
motion are taught in virtually every business school
program. Yet this research operates on the assump-
tion that employees engaged in promotion activities
are themselves unaffected by their work. Our research
suggests that the positive organizational consequences
of mandated attitude expression need to be weighed
against the potential systemic negative consequences
that such policies may have for trust, which is essential
for individual, organizational, and economic success.
Promotion Behavior and Organizationally
Mandated Attitude Expression
Promotion of company products is a prototypical con-
text for examining the consequences of mandated atti-
tude expression because promoting products comes
with a clear mandate to present products in a way
that makes the products desirable to consumers (Kotler
and Armstrong 2014), irrespective of the actual condi-
tions. Employees promoting products are encouraged
to present the product their organization is selling
positively (Boundless 2015) and to display enthusiasm
when communicating about the product (Efti 2014,
Szaky 2011). Because product promotion is a moti-
vated rather than an unbiased account, it may require
employees to present the product in a way that is not
entirely honest. To be sure, not all promotion behav-
ior requires organizational agents to be dishonest. It is
possible that there are products for which a matter-of-
fact presentation matches all possible desired qualities
that every single customer might seek. In these cases,
our theory would not apply.
However, not all products are such that a completely
frank presentation of the product would make all
potential customers purchase the product. And even
products that are objectively outstanding might not be
appropriate for every single potential customer. Ful-
filling the organizational mandate to present products
positively and enthusiastically may thus, in many situ-
ations, require employees to express attitudes that are
somewhat insincere. The luxury dress, although made
of high-quality materials, might not look very good on
the customer interested in buying it. The facial cream
a company sells is unlikely to halt or reverse ageing.
The specialty of the day might not truly be the waiter’s
favorite. These examples all describe common situa-
tions in which employees who want to sell the product
and perform well in their job must be less than entirely
honest.
There is much anecdotal real-world evidence sup-
porting the notion that product promotion often re-
quires dishonest communication. Cialdini and
Goldstein (2004) famously reviewed some techniques
that salespeople use to promote products. For example,
the “low-ball technique” involves offering customers
a deal that the salesperson knows is unrealistically
favorable to secure initial commitment, after which the
deal is modified to the detriment of the customer (who
is at that point known to be more likely to purchase
the product). Numerous sources of practical sales
advice are also indicative of the fact that employees
whose jobs involve promotion activities often feel
pressured to be dishonest. For example, some sources
recommend selling approaches that involve the least
amount of lying possible (Francis 2015, Kaput 2013),
and others suggest ways of coping with having to lie
while promoting products (Ken 2014, Rotenberg 2014).
Another suggestive piece of evidence is that sales-
related occupations are among the most distrusted
of all occupations (Gallup 2017). This perception
of salespeople might be, at least in part, because
promoting products effectively may require employees
to express attitudes that are insincere.
How do employees respond to performing work in
ways that are less than entirely honest? Cognitive dis-
sonance research suggests that people might, to some
extent, update their attitudes about the product to
avoid perceiving themselves as dishonest (Festinger
1957). For example, employees tasked with promot-
ing a low-quality product might force themselves to
believe that the product is high quality to avoid seeing
themselves as dishonest. However, in most instances,
it is impossible to fully revise one’s genuine atti-
tudes to match those one is mandated to express.
Indeed, cognitive dissonance effects tend to be negli-
gent when attitudes are assessed at a deeper, implicit
level (Gawronski and Strack 2004). Similarly, the emo-
tional labor perspective in organizational research
(Grandey 2003) suggests that people in some cases gen-
uinely change how they feel about something, but in
many cases, they are unable to do so fully (and merely
engage in “surface acting”). Thus, while it is possible
that people somewhat adjust their genuine attitudes
to match those they are mandated to express, they are
unlikely to do so fully and in all circumstances. This
implies that, on average, employees who are mandated
Pitesa, Goh, and Thau: Mandated Attitudes and Trust
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to express insincere attitudes will come to see their
behavior as less than entirely honest.
We build on social projection theory to argue that
a perception that one’s work behavior is less than
entirely honest affects how employees view and inter-
act with others. Social projection theory posits that the
perceptions we hold of other people’s characteristics
are largely influenced by how we perceive ourselves
(Cronbach 1955, Ross et al. 1977). The well-known
“false consensus effect” describes people’s tendency
to erroneously assume that their own beliefs and atti-
tudes are similar to others’ beliefs and attitudes (Ross
et al. 1977). Research on accuracy of self and other per-
ceptions (e.g., work on close relationships and work
using round-robin design in groups) also finds evi-
dence of “assumed similarity,” or the fact that “people
judge other individuals to be consistent with how they
judge themselves” (Kenny and West 2010, p. 196). For
example, people base their perception of how other
people feel (Van Boven and Loewenstein 2003) and how
extreme other people are in their political attitudes
(Van Boven et al. 2012) on how they currently feel them-
selves and how extreme their own political attitudes
are. Social projection occurs because of an egocentric
anchoring process, whereby people trying to ascer-
tain others’ attitudes start from their own attitudes
and then serially adjust until they reach a plausible
(and generally not fully accurate) assessment (Krueger
et al. 2006). In support of this explanation, Epley et al.
(2004) showed that people are more likely to indi-
cate that the other person’s perspective would be sim-
ilar to their own under time pressure (which reduces
the tendency to reevaluate the egocentric anchor) and
less likely when incentives for accuracy are provided
(which increases the tendency to reevaluate the ego-
centric anchor). Taken together, the logic of social pro-
jection suggests that if employees are mandated to
express attitudes that are dishonest, the perception that
their own behavior is more dishonest will make them
more likely to believe that other people also generally
behave more dishonestly.
The generalized view that others are more dishonest
is relevant for subsequent social interactions because
the perception of others’ honesty is an important fac-
tor in determining people’s willingness to trust others
(Kramer 1999, Rotter 1971, Yamagishi and Yamagishi
1994). Simply put, people are less willing to trust others
when they perceive that others are generally lacking
honesty. Changes in the generalized perception of oth-
ers’ honesty are less relevant with respect to people
with whom one has significant prior interaction his-
tory because, in such situations, one will have more
information about the other person’s honesty and there
will be less need to infer it (and thus be influenced by
self-perceived honesty and the perception of other peo-
ple’s honesty in general). However, the modern econ-
omy depends on the development of trust in novel
interactions, such as among members of newly formed
teams (Meyerson et al. 1995) or among potential busi-
ness partners (Gunia et al. 2011). In such cases, a gen-
eralized belief that other people are less honest should
make people less willing to trust a specific person with
whom one has not interacted yet. As Folkman (1984)
noted, “In the absence of clear information, the situ-
ation is like a projective test, and the person makes
inferences based on general experience and personal-
ity dispositions, which include beliefs, to understand
what is happening” (p. 841). Social projection theory
suggests that when trying to assess whether potential
new interaction partners are honest or not, employ-
ees will draw on their self-perceptions. We thus argue
that when employees are made to express attitudes
that may not be reflective of their genuine attitudes,
the self-perceived lack of honesty should lead them to
also view other people as less honest in general, which
should undermine trust in general and specific others.
This is the central idea that we examine in this research.
Empirical Context and Hypotheses
We conducted an initial test of the relationship between
product promotion and own trust in others (Study 1)
by analyzing the large-scale International Social Sur-
vey Programme (ISSP) data set. We examined levels of
trust among people employed in sales-related jobs (the
main task of which is to promote products and ser-
vices; Kotler and Armstrong 2014), relative to people
employed in all other jobs as well as relative to people
employed in jobs in which honesty is expected (such as
doctors and accountants; Gallup 2017). Specifically, if
our argument that mandated attitude expression influ-
ences trust because it reduces the perceived honesty of
the self is true, then we might see an even starker dif-
ference in levels of trust relative to people employed in
jobs in which they are expected to be honest.
Hypothesis 1. Employees in sales-related jobs exhibit lower
levels of trust in others compared with employees in all other
jobs and particularly compared with employees working in
jobs in which honesty is highly expected.
Although Study 1 allowed us to examine whether
the real-world pattern of trust conforms with our the-
ory, the data cannot speak to the causal impact of orga-
nizationally mandated insincerity on trust because it
is possible that people who are generally less trusting
self-select into jobs involving promotion. In addition,
these data did not allow us to test whether our hypoth-
esized psychological process explains the differences
in trust propensity. For these reasons, we conducted
two experiments that focused on situations in which
the genuine features of a low-quality product and the
required presentation of the product were either mis-
aligned (“present the product positively and enthu-
siastically”) or not (“present the product consistent
Pitesa, Goh, and Thau: Mandated Attitudes and Trust
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with your genuine opinions about the product”), con-
structed based on sales advice for conducting product
promotion effectively (Efti 2014, Mandino 1968, Szaky
2011, Tracy 2004). In this way, we recreate prototypical
features of situations in which the process described by
our theory is likely to operate because promoting the
low-quality product positively and enthusiastically (as
would be expected of any salesperson promoting such
a product) presents a mandate to employees to express
attitudes that might be somewhat different from their
genuine attitudes. Finally, after manipulating whether
people were mandated to express positive attitudes or
not, we examine consequences for participants’ view
of the self and others and of levels of trust. In the con-
text of the design described, our theory leads to the
following predictions.
Hypothesis 2. People who are mandated to promote a prod-
uct positively (versus honestly) will exhibit lower levels of
trust in others.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of mandated attitude expression
on trust is mediated by the perceived honesty of the self and,
in turn, the perceived honesty of others.
The design of Studies 2 and 3 allowed us to examine
effects of social projection over and above any poten-
tial effects of attitude updating resulting from cogni-
tive dissonance reduction processes. Specifically, peo-
ple should report their self-perceived honesty to be
lower following mandated attitude expression only to
the extent that they perceive their behavior as some-
what dishonest. To the extent that they fully revise
their attitudes to match those they are mandated to
express, there is no reason why self-perceived hon-
esty would be impacted. While it is possible that peo-
ple somewhat revise their attitudes, the past work we
reviewed earlier suggests that they are unlikely to do
so to a large extent or fully. If so, self-perceived hon-
esty should be impacted, triggering the resulting social
projection processes, and these are the focus of the
present research. One feature of these studies rele-
vant to this concerns the fact that participants received
financial compensation for their participation, which
might render cognitive dissonance reduction processes
less pronounced (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959). Yet
this feature of our tasks is aligned with how man-
dated attitude expression occurs in organizations, as
employees generally work for money. Finally, Study 3
also includes measures that tested for possible other
psychological influences in the situation, as well as the
role of initial attitudes about the product.
Across studies, we operationalize individual willing-
ness to trust in related but somewhat different ways
that were appropriate for the study setting. The Study 1
data set involved a measure of trust propensity or a
generalized tendency to trust others (Colquitt et al.
2007). We measured the same construct in Study 2, in
which participants engaged in the study individually
and in an online context. However, Study 3 took place
in a laboratory setting, so it was feasible to investigate
trust in a specific other person. Consistentwith our the-
ory, we focused on thewillingness to trust a novel inter-
action partner. Self-perceived honesty and perceptions
of others’ honesty should influence trust primarily in
relation to people with whom one does not have much
prior interaction history (Colquitt et al. 2007, Fulmer
and Gelfand 2012), who are increasingly important as
economic exchange partners in the modern economy
(Meyerson et al. 1995). Generalized trust influences and
is thus related to trust in specific novel interaction part-
ners (Colquitt et al. 2007), sowe expected similar effects
across studies, but we deemed it informative to exam-
ine whether the effect holds in relation to the different
operationalizations of trust.
This project has a dedicated Open Science Frame-
work web page (https://osf.io/vwxfe/?view_only=b2
763a963bbd493087855768e75c5680) containing study
materials, data, and analysis syntaxes for new data
collections (experiments) we conducted (Studies 2
and 3). Data used in Study 1 are publicly available at
http://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-
by-topic/work-orientations/2005/ (accessedMarch 28,
2018). The project web page contains extracted vari-
ables used in our analyses as well as the syntax for
the analyses. There were no unreported exclusions in
any of the studies, and neither of the two experiments
included measures or manipulations apart from those
described in the paper. Sample sizes for experiments
were set in advance, as described in our report of the
studies.
Study 1
Method
Data Set. Study 1 data were obtained from the ISSP.
The ISSP is a large, cross-national survey collaboration
investigating a wide range of topics in the social sci-
ences. Several waves of surveys have been run, from
1985 to date, on topics such as politics, religion, gen-
der roles, and others. Data were collected through
mail or written or oral survey among a stratified ran-
dom sample of the adult population. Our data came
from the module “Work Orientations,” administered
in 1989, 1997, 2005, and 2015. This module addresses
questions related to one’s work as well as general ques-
tions measuring outlook on life. The focal question
about trust was administered in 2005. The 2005 ques-
tionnaire was administered across 20 countries, includ-
ing, for example, France, Mexico, New Zealand, South
Korea, Russia, and the United States. A total of 20,959
responses were available for the main analysis look-
ing at levels of trust across occupations. Respondents’
average age was 45.48 years (SD  15.73), and 50.40%
of them were women.
Pitesa, Goh, and Thau: Mandated Attitudes and Trust
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Measures
Occupation. In 2005, the ISSP included a detailed clas-
sification of occupations based on the International
Standard Classification of Occupations created by the
International Labour Organization (2015). We classi-
fied participants’ jobs into those clearly involving sales
duties (e.g., “shop salespersons and demonstrators,”
“door-to-door, telephone salespersons,” “street ven-
dors and related workers”) and all others. In addition,
to explore levels of trust in occupations in which the
level of honesty is expected, we added another cate-
gory that denoted jobs in which honesty is expected.
To select occupations in which honesty is expected,
we consulted the Gallup (2017) poll on perceptions
of ethics in different occupations, and from this, we
chose three occupations that had good representa-
tion in the data set: nurses, doctors, and accountants.
This selection was also suggested by an anonymous
reviewer. The selection of occupations was thus deter-
mined prior to conducting any analyses, and we made
no additional unreported analyses. We coded the vari-
able in two ways, either by combining the three occu-
pations in which honesty is expected or by including
each occupation in which honesty was expected sepa-
rately (see below).
Trust Propensity. The measure Trust propensity was
measured by asking participants whether they were
“generally trusting” (1  strongly agree, 5  strongly
disagree). We reversed the measure such that higher
values indicate greater trust propensity.
Controls. We additionally examined whether the re-
sults are robust to controlling for key demographic
variables of age, gender, education (in years), self-
reported income, and marital status.
Results and Discussion
Figure 2 depicts levels of trust across different occu-
pations. An ordinary least squares regression analy-
sis with robust standard errors found, using indicator
variables, that working in a sales-related job was asso-
ciated with less trust propensity (M  3.67, SD  1.06)
(b −0.08, p  0.007) andworking in jobs in which hon-
esty is expected with more trust propensity (M  4.02,
SD 0.81) (b  0.27, p < 0.001), compared with working
in all other jobs (M  3.75, SD  0.98). Examining each
occupation in which honesty is expected separately, we
found that compared with the baseline (all other occu-
pations), working as an accountantwas associatedwith
more trust propensity (M  3.93, SD  0.87) (b  0.18,
p  0.011), working as a doctor with even more trust
propensity (M  4.01, SD  0.87) (b  0.26, p  0.003),
and working as a nurse with more trust propensity
still (M  4.11, SD  0.75) (b  0.36, p < 0.001). Results
were robust to controlling for the demographic vari-
ables described above. We also analyzed the data using
Figure 2. Study 1: Willingness to Trust Across Occupations
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Sales All other
jobs
Jobs with
honesty
expected
Account-
ants
Doctors Nurses
Notes. “Jobs with honesty expected” include accountants, doctors,
and nurses combined, and “All other jobs” include all responses
excluding sales and jobs with honesty expected. Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals.
a multilevel model with cases nested within countries,
and the results hold. Taken together, the results sup-
port Hypothesis 1.
Study 2
Method
Participants and Design. We recruited 200 employed
adults (mean age  34.03, 59.00% male; 86.50% cur-
rently employed full or part time) through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform (Buhrmester
et al. 2011). These participants, called “MTurkers” per-
formed the task in exchange for 1$. MTurkers are
regularly recruited to write product reviews, often-
times in a one-sided, positive manner, irrespective of
their genuine opinions (Ipeirotis 2009). Thus, this task
has both psychological and mundane realism for this
population.
Procedure and Materials. Participants were randomly
assigned to either the mandated attitude expression or
the control condition. They were told that the purpose
of the task was to help us “develop customer product
reviews.” Participants were informed they would be
asked to write a review of a product and that wewould
use the reviews on a web page for further marketing
purposes. We emphasized that other people would be
able to read the website when considering products
for purchase. The product was said to be a proprietary
blend intended to help adults grow taller. We provided
details about purported chemical content and reasons
why the product is believed to be effective. The descrip-
tionwas intended to parallel those found onmany sup-
plements in health stores and online. At the same time,
we assumed that participants would view the prod-
uct as unlikely to fulfill its purported use. If so, asking
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participants to present the product positively (as most
companies would expect from their employees) should
require people to be somewhat dishonest and, if our
theory is correct, erode perceived honesty of the self,
perceived honesty of others, and finally trust.
Mandated Attitude Expression Manipulation. Partici-
pants were then asked to write a review of the prod-
uct and make it positive and enthusiastic (reflective
of their genuine personal opinion). We emphasized
that this is necessary because we seek to distribute
positive (honest) reviews, and we reminded partici-
pants that we would ostensibly present their review to
potential customers on our web page. Participants then
wrote their reviews in a text box. The specific content
(i.e., the emphasis on presenting products in a positive
and enthusiastic manner) was informed by a review
of practical advice to employees engaged in promotion
behavior (Mandino 1968, Tracy 2004).
A sample review a participant wrote in the control
condition included, “This product is meant to help
people grow taller and promote bone strength and
density as well as strong joint support. While I believe
the supplementswould support bone strength, I would
not count on actual growth. One might appear taller
due to possibly posture changes from stronger bones
and joints, but as height is largely determined by genet-
ics, I wouldn’t expect too much out of a supplement”
(control condition). An example in the mandated atti-
tude expression condition is, “This is an excellent prod-
uct. You can expect to gain a few inches without having
to do anything other than taking some pills. Not only
that, it helps with your bone and joint health to boot—
it’s like killing two birdswith one stone. You really can’t
go wrong with this supplement” See the data online
for all reviews.
Perceived Honesty of the Self and Others. Following
themanipulation, we asked participants to what extent
Table 1. Studies 2 and 3: Variable Summaries and Correlations
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
Study 2
1. Trust 3.00 0.53
2. Mandated attitude expression 0.49 0.50 −0.18
3. Perceived honesty of the self 3.32 1.61 0.16 −0.69
4. Perceived honesty of the others 3.33 0.96 0.55 −0.28 0.40
Study 3
1. Trust (1st measurement) 3.29 0.80
2. Trust (2nd measurement) 3.07 0.88 0.89
3. Mandated attitude expression 0.49 0.50 −0.05 −0.27
4. Perceived honesty of the self 3.98 1.11 0.10 0.24 −0.59
5. Perceived honesty of the others 2.51 0.86 0.11 0.29 −0.29 0.44
6. Initial attitudes toward the product 2.88 0.94 0.14 0.14 −0.11 0.33 0.20
7. Negative affect 1.33 0.47 0.08 0.01 0.13 −0.27 −0.07 −0.15
Notes. In Study 2, N  200; all correlations are significant at p < 0.05. In Study 3, N  155; correlations
above |0.15| are significant at p < 0.05.
they perceived their behavior as “sincere,” “honest,”
and “truthful” (1  not at all, 5  completely; α 
0.97). In addition, we asked them to what extent they
thought other people are generally “sincere,” “honest,”
and “truthful” on the same scale (α 0.95). These items
were taken from a scale used to measure morality in
person perception in prior work (Wojciszke et al. 1998).
Trust Propensity. Next, participants responded to a
scale measuring trust propensity (Mayer and Davis
1999). The scale consists of eight items (e.g., “One
should be very cautious with strangers,” “These days,
you must be alert or someone is likely to take advan-
tage of you,” where both items are reverse-coded; α 
0.72). The study then ended, and participants were
thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 contains variable summaries and correlations,
and Figure 3 depicts responses by condition.
Manipulation Check. We checked the effectiveness of
the manipulation by examining the product reviews
participants wrote. First, we had a rater, blind to the
conditions, coding each essay for how (1) positively
and (2) enthusiastically the product was presented (1
not at all, 5 very much). The two items were strongly
correlated (r  0.84, p < 0.001), so we averaged them.
The product was presentedmore positively and enthu-
siastically in the mandated attitude expression condi-
tion (M 4.26, SD 0.84) than in the control condition
(M  2.21, SD  1.09) (t198  14.86, p < 0.001). These
results suggest the manipulation was effective.
Hypothesis 2 Test. Participants in the mandated atti-
tude expression condition displayed a lower trust
propensity (M 2.90, SD 0.56) than did control group
participants (M 3.10, SD 0.48) (t198  2.64, p  0.009).
The result provides support for Hypothesis 2.
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Figure 3. Study 2: Responses by Condition
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Hypothesis 3 Test. Participants in the mandated atti-
tude expression condition saw themselves as behav-
ing less honestly (M  2.20, SD  1.40) than control
group participants did (M  4.41, SD  0.89) (t198 
13.34, p < 0.001). Moreover, we found evidence of social
projection of self-perceived honesty, such that the per-
ceived honesty of the self predicted how honest oth-
ers were perceived (r  0.40, p < 0.001). Others were
viewed as less honest in the mandated attitude expres-
sion condition (M  3.06, SD  1.03) than in the con-
trol condition (M  3.59, SD  0.80) (t198  4.07, p <
0.001). Finally, the perception of the honesty of oth-
ers predicted participants’ trust propensity (r  0.55,
p < 0.001).
We tested mediation by examining whether man-
dated attitude expression indirectly predicted trust
propensity by predicting the perceived honesty of
the self and, in turn, the perceived honesty of oth-
ers (we controlled for the condition in each equation).
Structural equation modeling was used to estimate
the effects, and we constructed a bias-corrected con-
fidence interval of the indirect effect using the boot-
strapmethodwith 5,000 bootstrap samples (Shrout and
Bolger 2002). Figure 1 summarizes the model and the
results. We found that mandated attitude expression
was indirectly negatively associated with trust propen-
sity through a negative association with the perceived
honesty of the self and, in turn, the perceived honesty
of others (95% confidence interval: −0.26, −0.09). The
results provide support for Hypothesis 3.
Study 3
Study 3 was a constructive replication in the lab. We
used a similar design as in Study 2 but asked partic-
ipants to review a product that they were physically
providedwith.We allegedwewould record their prod-
uct review using a microphone (either involving man-
dated attitude expression or not), which was meant
to roughly parallel a situation in which employees are
mandated to express favorable attitudes about prod-
ucts in oral communication (telephone sales, interact-
ing with customers in stores or restaurants, etc.). We
also used a subtler manipulation such that we told par-
ticipants in the mandated attitude expression condi-
tion not that they should be positive and enthusiastic
(as we did in the prior study) but merely that we are
looking to sell the product and that they should present
the product in a way that helps sales. This instruc-
tion mapped onto job descriptions of many employees,
increasing the generalizability of our conclusions to a
broad range of jobs. Specifically, if employees being
asked to promote the product in a way that helps sales
(which is the goal of virtually all sales efforts) is suf-
ficient to produce the negative consequences of man-
dated attitude expression on trust, then the effect we
study is likely to operate across a wide range of sales
situations. The lab setting also allowed us to measure
the willingness to trust a specific other person present
in the situation, which was not an option in the con-
text of an anonymous online product review that we
focused on in Study 2 and where we deemed measur-
ing generalized willingness to trust to be more appro-
priate. The generalized unwillingness to trust we doc-
umented in Studies 1 and 2 should manifest itself in
being unwilling to trust a novel interaction partner.
In addition to these design modifications, we also
introduced a few additions that increased the inter-
nal validity of this theory test. First, we wanted to
test a potential alternative explanation that the effect
stems not from perception of own behavior as dishon-
est (and its projection onto other people) but rather
from the fact that participants are asked by the exper-
imenters to engage in somewhat dishonest behavior,
whichmay directly signal that other people lack benev-
olence and integrity and should not be trusted. To
test this possibility, we measured trust twice. The first
time, it was measured right after receiving instructions
regarding the presentation of the product (i.e., right
after the mandated attitude expression manipulation)
and before participants engaged in the presentation of
the product. At this point, participants have not done
anything personally, so the effect on trust could not be
driven by their own behavior. Thus, any effect of the
mandated attitude expression manipulation on trust
would be due to information received about other peo-
ple. The second time, we measured trust after partic-
ipants completed the product promotion. Any effect
driven by perception of own behavior as dishonest
would be evident in this round of trust measurement.1
We favored our explanation focusing on self-projection
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because in the situation of mandated attitude expres-
sion, the information about the self is new and salient,
as having to be dishonest can be an experience that can
be disconcerting. On the other hand, being told to pro-
mote products in a way that helps sales is something
that most people expect from those who have an inter-
est in promoting products. Nevertheless, we deemed it
informative to test this alternative explanation.
Another new feature of this study was that we mea-
sured participants’ initial views about the product
before instructing them how they should be reviewing
the product. This allowed for a more rigorous test of
the idea that the discrepancy between one’s genuine
attitudes about the product on the one hand and how
the product was presented on the other is driving the
effect on self-perceived honesty, the perceived honesty
of others, and trust. Specifically, the negative effect of
mandated attitude expression on trust should be most
pronounced among those participants whose honest
views are negative and who thus should be more dis-
honest compared with participants with less negative
views. For participants who honestly are positive and
enthusiastic about the product, there is no reason why
engaging in mandated attitude expression would lead
them to perceive themselves as dishonest. Thus, test-
ing initial attitudes about the product as a moderator
of the effect we study allowed for an additional way
of probing our explanation and testing an important
boundary condition of the effect.
Finally, we measured negative affect participants felt
following the manipulation. Literature on acting sug-
gests that having to appear in a way that is not reflec-
tive of one’s genuine disposition can be emotionally
aversive (Grandey 2003). Dunn and Schweitzer (2005)
have shown that negative affect may influence trust
because people misattribute their negative emotions to
the judgment they are asked to make (Schwarz 2012).
Thus, it is possible that the effect of mandated atti-
tude expression on trust is partly due to negative affect.
We thought this was a possibility, but we also thought
negative affect would constitute a concurrent (rather
than alternative) pathway through which mandated
attitude expression influences trust. Irrespective of any
role of negative affect, to the extent that people also
update their view of their and others’ honesty, our
hypothesized process should operate. Thus, we tested
whether mandated attitude expression affected nega-
tive affect and whether our effect persisted after con-
trolling for negative affect in all the analyses.
Method
Participants. We recruited 155 participants (mean
age  23.14, 65.16% female) through a behavioral lab
of a business school to participate in the study in
exchange for 10e. The target sample size was deter-
mined in advance, and we communicated to the lab
manager to stop further recruitment once the sample
was about 150. Participants were randomly assigned to
either the mandated attitude expression condition or
the control condition.
Procedure. Participants were told that the purpose of
the study was to help develop promotional materi-
als that would be used in research. Participants were
informed that to help in creating the promotionalmate-
rials, they would present a product to potential cus-
tomers verbally, which we would then give to con-
sumers in subsequent studies on consumer decision
making. All materials were in French, translated from
English by individuals who translate materials for
research studies as part of their work in the lab.
Participants were taken to cubicles and seated
behind a desk equipped with a computer. They were
provided with a low-quality MP3 player they were
supposed to review. We had purposefully purchased
a device that received fairly negative reviews at the
online shop from which it was bought. Specifically,
when we accessed the web page, there were 309
reviews by prior customers; the modal score was
one star out of five (127 users gave the product the
lowest score); the mean was 2.4.2 The product was
made of appreciably low-quality material that made its
intended use difficult (e.g., many users reported diffi-
culty pressing the buttons). Participants were encour-
aged to touch and use the MP3 player to allow them
to take note of the low quality of the product. We
expected that asking participants to give a positive
opinion of a visibly poor product (as would neverthe-
less be expected of most salespeople) would reduce the
perceived honesty of the self.
Initial Attitudes Regarding the Product. Participants
were asked to report whether they were positive and
enthusiastic about the product (1  strongly disagree,
5 strongly agree; α  0.8).
Mandated Attitude Expression Manipulation. Next,
participants used the computer to ostensibly record
their product presentation. The instructions asked par-
ticipants in the mandated attitude expression (control)
condition to present the product in away that helps sell
the product (honestly and genuinely), and as an exam-
ple, the instructions suggested that when describing
the quality of the product to customers, they should
have in mind that we are looking to sell the product
(have in mind that they should be honest about the
quality of the product).
First Willingness to Trust Measure. The context of the
lab study provided a cover story for measuring indi-
vidual willingness to trust a specific other person twice
with minimum risk of demand effects. Specifically, we
told participants that as a standard procedure imple-
mented by the behavioral lab, we are seeking their
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feedback on the lab and its staff at the beginning (fol-
lowing the introduction to the study) as well as at the
end of the study. Participants were asked a few filler
questions about lab facilities, which were followed by
the focal questions about the degree to which partici-
pants trusted the experimenter. The items taken from
Mayer and Davis (1999) and Mayer and Gavin (2005)
were adapted to the study context. We focused on pos-
itively worded items to minimize the risk of reputa-
tional damage to the lab and to minimize suspicion
regarding the questions. Specifically, participants indi-
cated to what extent they agreed (1 strongly disagree,
5  strongly agree) with the following items: “I would
let the experimenter have influence over issues that
are important to me,” “I would be willing to let the
experimenter have control over developments that con-
cern me in this study,” “I would be comfortable relying
on the experimenter for a task or problem which was
critical to me, even if I could not monitor the exper-
imenter’s actions,” “I would share my opinion about
sensitive issues with the experimenter even if my opin-
ion were unpopular,” and “If the experimenter asked
why a problem happened, I would speak freely even if
I were partly to blame” (α  0.78).
Product Review and Manipulation Check. Participants
were then given time to prepare their verbal presenta-
tion of the product and were provided with pen and
paper if they wanted to make notes. Once ready to
record the presentation, they were asked to put on a
headset, position the microphone close to their mouth,
and click a button, which suggested that the recording
was starting. Participants had three minutes to present
the product. To check the effectiveness of the manip-
ulation, after recording the presentation, participants
indicated using two items: whether they presented the
product in a way that is positive and whether they pre-
sented the product in a way that is enthusiastic (1 
strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree; α  0.68).
Perceived Honesty of the Self and Others. Follow-
ing the presentation of the product, participants re-
sponded to the same measures of the perceived hon-
esty of the self (α  0.92) and others (α  0.81) used in
Study 2.
Negative Affect. Next, participants responded to a ver-
sion of the Negative Affect Schedule by Watson et al.
(1988). Because the study was conducted in French, we
opted for the five-item version of the scale validated
for “international” use by Thompson (2007). This ver-
sion of the scale is shorter than the original 10-item
scale, which was desirable given that we had no theo-
retical basis for testing the effects of specific emotions
but were only interested in the role of overall nega-
tive affect, and the shorter scale reduced the risk of
participant fatigue. Participants indicated the extent to
which at that moment they felt the following five neg-
ative affective states: “upset,” “hostile,” “ashamed,”
“nervous,” and “afraid” (1  definitely do not feel, 5 
extremely; α  0.69).
Second Willingness to Trust Measure. Finally, partic-
ipants again responded to the same trust measure as
before (α  0.73).
Results and Discussion
Table 1 contains variable summaries and correlations,
and Figure 4 depicts responses by condition.
Manipulation Check. Participants in the mandated
attitude expression reported having reviewed the
product more positively and enthusiastically (M 3.56,
SD  0.77) than did control group participants (M 
2.96, SD 0.91) (t153  4.45, p < 0.001).
Alternative Explanations. There were no differences
in the initial levels of willingness to trust the exper-
imenter (p  0.502), excluding the explanation that
effects of mandated attitude expression are driven by
the mere mandate to express attitudes (rather than the
act of attitude expression itself). In addition, the effect
of the manipulation on negative affect was not signif-
icant (p  0.095). Nevertheless, we also reran all the
analyses reported below (including the mediation test)
controlling for negative affect, and we found that all
the results held and that negative affect was not a sig-
nificant mediator.
Hypothesis 2 Test. We regressed the second mea-
sure of willingness to trust on the manipulation, con-
trolling for the first measure of willingness to trust.
After reviewing the product, participants in the man-
dated attitude expression condition were less willing
to trust the experimenter (M  2.83, SD  0.88) than
were control group participants (M  3.30, SD  0.81)
(t152  6.71, p < 0.001). This result provides support for
Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 Test. Participants in the mandated atti-
tude expression condition (M  3.32, SD  1.15) saw
themselves as behaving less honestly than the control
group participants (M 4.63, SD 0.55) (t153  9.12, p <
0.001). We found evidence of the social projection of
self-perceived honesty, such that the perceived honesty
of the self predicted how honest others were perceived
to be (r  0.45, p < 0.001). Others were viewed as less
honest in the mandated attitude expression condition
(M 2.26, SD 0.83) than in the control condition (M
2.76, SD  0.81) (t153  3.80, p < 0.001). Finally, the per-
ception of the honesty of others was related to partic-
ipants’ willingness to trust the experimenter (r  0.29,
p < 0.001). We used the same procedure to test medi-
ation as in Study 2 (see Figure 1 for model summary
and results). We found mandated attitude expression
was indirectly negatively associated with willingness
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Figure 4. Study 3: Responses by Condition
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to trust [−0.11, −0.03] through a negative association
with the perceived honesty of the self and, in turn,
the perceived honesty of others (controlling for condi-
tion in all equations). The results provide support for
Hypothesis 3.
Role of Initial Attitudes. Next, we examined whether
participants’ initial attitudes moderated the effect.
Consistent with expectations, we found that the effect
of the mandated attitude expression manipulation on
the perceived honesty of the self (b  0.64, p < 0.001),
the perceived honesty of others (b  0.46, p  0.001),
and trust (b  0.26, p < 0.001) was stronger among par-
ticipants whose initial attitudes regarding the product
were less positive than among participants whose ini-
tial attitudes were more positive (coefficients are for
interactions between the manipulation and initial atti-
tudes in predicting each outcome). The indirect effect
was also significantly stronger among these partici-
pants [−0.26, −0.02] as indicated by a bootstrap test
of the difference in the indirect effect between partici-
pants whose initial attitudes were 1 SD above the mean
and those whose attitudes were 1 SD below the mean
[0.01, 0.18].
Discussion
In a large survey, we found that individuals employed
in sales jobs, in which the expression of organiza-
tionally mandated attitudes is particularly common
(Williams et al. 2009), reported that they generally are
less trusting than employees not involved in sales. Two
experiments found causal evidence for the idea that
mandating people express attitudes that may not hon-
estly represent the state of affairs (bymaking them pro-
mote products positively irrespective of the products’
actual features) undermines their willingness to trust
general and specific others. We used different prod-
ucts and tasks across the two experiments. Study 2
asked participants to promote herbal growth pills
through written reviews. This product was unlikely to
be effective, thus requiring participants to be dishon-
est when we mandated that the product be reviewed
positively (as arguably most companies would require
from their agents). We found that participants’ self-
view about honesty predicted their general view of
others’ honesty and their willingness to trust others.
The task in Study 2 asked participants to communicate
orally about an effective but rather low-quality MP3
player. Again, we found that mandating participants
to present the product positively (compared with hon-
estly) led participants to see their behavior as lacking
honesty, which predicted their general view of others’
honesty and their trust in a specific other person. In
sum, the results are consistent with our social projec-
tion account of the effect of mandated attitude expres-
sion on trust.
Practical Implications
Our work points to potential courses of action that
might help combat distrust among employees. One
implication of our work is that managers should not
mandate that employees be dishonest when this can be
avoided. Yet we acknowledge that it may be difficult
to discourage organizations from using such practices.
One alternative solution is informed by the psycholog-
ical mechanism identified by this research. Managers
might want to organize training programs for employ-
ees that inform them of the potential negative effects of
mandated attitude expression and help them ward off
problematic consequences for their view of and rela-
tionships with other people.
Another practical implication of the finding that
mandating employees to express certain attitudes
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changes their self-perception, as well as perception of
and relationship with other people, concerns the con-
tentious issue of fair remuneration. People engage in
various uncomfortable or personally harmful jobs, but
the knowledge of the negative aspects of the job usu-
ally allows them to command higher compensation
(Viscusi 1978). Our work suggests that there is a hith-
erto overlooked reason why those whose jobs involve a
great deal of mandated attitude expression (e.g., sales
agents) should be compensated more. This is particu-
larly notable in light of the fact that some categories
of employees who are most exposed to organizational
mandates concerning attitude expression earn among
the lowest wages; for instance, across the entire range
of retail jobs in the United States, salespeople in 2013
earned on average just $12.20 per hour (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2013).
Future Research
Our theory applies to situations in which employees
must express attitudes that do not honestly represent
their attitudes. This boundary condition of our the-
ory may guide future research that can systematically
identify jobs and industries in which the effect we
document is more or less pronounced. One relevant
observation here is that there are major differences in
terms of customer satisfaction across industries. For
example, healthcare service generally elicits a higher
degree of customer satisfaction than does the retail
and wholesale industry (Savitz 2012). In industries in
which people are generally less satisfiedwith products,
persuading potential customers to purchase products
might require employees to be insincere to perform
their work effectively and sell the products. A related
fact is that employees working in healthcare are seen as
more trustworthy than people working in sales (Gallup
2017). Taken together, these facts imply that employees
working in sales jobs experience a particularly unpleas-
ant work situation: they are more likely to interact with
dissatisfied customers who do not trust them, and they
also come to be less trusting because of their jobs. Inter-
ventions by organizational decision makers and pol-
icy makers might thus be particularly effective when
targeting this segment of employees. Future work is
needed to examine this possibility.
Future research may also examine other instances
of mandated attitude expression in organizations and
how these mandates shape individual differences in
trust propensity, developing a richer understanding
of how features of jobs shape employee personality.
While we focused on the context of product promo-
tion, employees are expected to be positive not just
about products and services their organization is deliv-
ering but also about various other aspects of their orga-
nization. For example, employees are often involved
in recruitment of new organizational members, and
arguably, the tacit expectation is to present the orga-
nization so that it helps the goal of recruiting the best
candidates. In fact, some constructs used to conceptual-
ize dedicated organizational members, such as organi-
zational identification, are operationalized by measur-
ing the extent to which employees are invested in their
organization being presented positively (e.g., Mael and
Ashforth 1992). Future research could thus examine
how trust propensity varies as a function of various
additional organizational situations that may create an
implicit or explicit mandate to present the organization
positively.
Our research may open new avenues of exploration
on the conditions and effects of jobs that involve man-
dated attitude expression. Research on “acting” exam-
ined the effectiveness and consequences of customer-
oriented jobs (Grandey 2003). The main concern in
this literature is the fact that such jobs can be difficult
to perform, which might impact both the well-being
(e.g., through exhaustion and job dissatisfaction) and
the effectiveness of employees performing this type of
work. A more fundamental feature of much commu-
nication with customers is that organizational agents
often need to be less than entirely honest.We show that
this job feature may shape employees’ own behavior
in unrelated social interactions. The observation that
employees are expected to express dishonest attitudes
as part of their work may have other consequences that
are worth investigating. People generally prefer to see
themselves as honest (Aquino and Reed 2002). How do
employees cope with the self-implications of being dis-
honest as part of their work? Cognitive dissonance the-
ory suggests that employeeswill either revise their self-
concept downward, a solution that is not acceptable to
most people (Sedikides and Strube 1997); change their
behavior, a solution that may not be feasible if express-
ing dishonest attitudes is a job requirement; or change
their attitudes about the importance of honesty. Chang-
ing attitudes about the importance of honesty might
be the easiest solution for most employees, yet this
reasoning points to a disturbing possibility: employees
who must express dishonest attitudes may experience
an erosion of their moral standards. Future work is
needed to test such potential consequences of organi-
zationally mandated attitude expression. But this dis-
cussion highlights the possibility that the social con-
sequences of mandated attitude expression go much
beyond those considered thus far.
Conclusion
Many jobs in the modern economy require employ-
ees to communicate with potential customers in a way
that is meant to sell rather than honestly to inform.
This widespread job requirement creates fundamen-
tal tension between the ways employees are expected
to behave and the values that underlie broader social
Pitesa, Goh, and Thau: Mandated Attitudes and Trust
430 Organization Science, 2018, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 418–431, ©2018 INFORMS
relations, most notably honesty. We show that man-
dating organizational agents to express attitudes that
are less than entirely honest may come at a significant
social cost. We hope that our work motivates a more
measured and socially responsible use of mandated
attitude expression by organizations, as well as further
research into ways in which such work can be made
less damaging to employees and the society.
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